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The object of this article is to consider (i) the circumstances in which 
the buyer of goods being carried by sea can sue the carrier in contract 
in respect of loss of or damage to the goods and (ii) whether, perhaps 
lacking any such remedy, the buyer can assert an alternative claim in tort 
where the loss or damage happened befoie he acquired title. The latter 
claim is a controversial one and the discussion will, therefore, concentrate 
in particular on the various legal problems it raises. Furthermore, as similar 
kinds of claims may be made in other, different, contexts, the wider 
implications of allowing or denying a subsequent owner's claim wiil also 
be examined. 
The present concern is only with the international carriage of goods. 
Contracts for the carriage of goods within New Zealand are governed by 
the Carriage of Goods Act 1979 and will not be discussed here. 
The international carriage of goods by sea from any port in New Zealand 
to any port outside New Zealand under contracts of carriage covered by 
a bill of lading or similar document of title is governed by the Sea Carriage 
of Goods Act 1940. By section 7(1) and the Schedule, the Act gives statutory 
force to the set of uniform rules relating to bills of lading adopted by 
the Brussels Convention of 1924, known as the Hague Rules. The Act requires 
(in section 9) that every bill of lading or similar document of title issued 
in New Zealand must contain an express statement that it is to have effect 
subject to the provisions of the Rules as applied by the Act. The Act does 
not apply to goods imported into New Zealand. However, such goods 
normally will be carried pursuant to contracts evidenced by bills of lading 
subject to the Hague Rules or, since the amendment to the Brussels 
Convention by the Brussels Protocol of 1968, the Hague-Visby Rules.' 
The Rules regulate in considerable detail the rights, duties and immunities 
of the carrier. They provide an intricate blend of responsibilities and 
liabilities2, rights and immunities3, limitations in the amount of damages 
recoverabled, time bars5, indemnities6, and liberties'. 
Goods are not invariably shipped pursuant to contracts evidenced by 
a bill of lading. The advent of container shipping has led to increasing 
use of the ocean waybill, which is a non-transferable receipt and contract 
of carriage. The waybill is not a document of title and seemingly is not 
1 See Generally Goode Commercial Law (1982) Ch. 23. The Visby amendments have not 
been incorporated into the domestic law of New Zealand. For the changes they introduced 
see Diamond "The Hague-Visby Rules" [I9781 L.M.C.L.Q. 225. 
Article 111. 
3 Article IV. 
Article IV, rule 5. 
Article IV, rule 6. 
Article 111, rule 5 and Article IV, rule 6. 
Article IV, rules 4 and 6. 
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subject to the Hague Rules8 although this cannot be regarded as certain9. 
In any event all ocean waybills incorporate the Hague Rules or the Hague- 
Visby Rules into the contract, although problems can arise as regards the 
authority of the incorporated Rules in relation to the existing terms of 
the waybill.10 
The shipper of goods who makes the contract of carriage may of course 
be the buyer or seller. In the case of a c.i.f. or c. and f. contract obviously 
the seller is the contracting party and even in the case of an f.0.b. contract 
the seller may make the contract on the buyer's behalf. In these cases where 
there is no privity as between the buyer and the carrier there arises a potential 
source of difficulty for a buyer seeking redress from the carrier for loss 
of or damage to the goods. It has been overcome for most cases, by the 
early development of a special common law exception to the privity rule 
and thereafter by statutory intervention. Some problems remain, however, 
as will be seen. 
Clearly the seller who is party to the contract can sue so long as the 
loss or damage happens before the property in the goods passes to the 
buyer. If the buyer later pays for the goods and the seller thereafter sues 
the carrier, he holds the proceeds of the action as trustee for the buyer." 
Where the breach occurs after the property has been transferred the seller 
suffers no loss and if he sues the carrier then on ordinary principles he 
should recover only nominal damages. However it was held by the House 
of Lords in Dunlop v Lumber212 that in such a case the seller still could 
recover substantial damages against the shipowner but would be accountable 
to the true owner for the proceeds of his judgment. Recently in The 
Albazerol3 Lord Diplock rationalised DunlopS case as an application of 
the principle that in a commercial contract concerning goods where it is 
in the contemplation of the parties that the proprietary interests in the 
goods may be transferred from one owner to another after the contract 
has been entered into and before the breach which causes loss or damage 
to the goods, an original party to the contract, if such be the intention 
of them both, is to be treated in law as having entered into the contract 
for the benefit of all persons who have or may acquire an interest in the 
goods before they are lost or damaged, and is entitled to recover by way 
of damages for breach of contract the actual loss sustained b: those for 
whose benefit the contract is entered into. 
Dunlop's case was decided at a time when the non-contracting consignee 
had no other right of action in respect of the goods. In The A l b ~ z e r o ' ~  
Lord Diplock considered that its rationale could no longer apply to cases 
covered by the Bills of Lading Act 1855 (U.K.) which, as will be seen, 
does give the consignee an independent right to suel5, nor to contracts 
8 Goode, op.cit. at 569. 
9 Tetley "Waybills: The Modern Contract of Carriage of Goods by Sea" (1983) 14 J.M.L.C. 
465 at 471. 
10 Ibid. 
The Charlorre [I9081 P. 206. 
12 (1839) 6 Cl. & F. 600; 7 E.R. 824. 
13 [I9771 A.C. 774 at 847. 
14 Ibid., at 847-848. 
' 5  See below p.88 
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which contemplate that the carrier will also enter into separate contracts 
of carriage with whoever may become the owner of goods carried pursuant 
to the original contract.16 On this reasoning Dunlop would not apply either 
to cases falling within the terms of the Contracts (Privity) Act 198217. 
Furthermore, with the development of the law of negligence since 1839, 
where the carrier's breach of contract is caused by negligence there is no 
objection to the buyer with property suing the carrier for negligence alone. 
In Karlshamns Oljefabriker v Eastport Navigation Corporation: The E2afi18 
for example, damage by water was done to a cargo of copra after title 
had passed to the plaintiff buyers, who were thus held entitled to sue the 
negligent shipowners in tort. 
In other cases it seems the seller can still sue for substantial damages. 
In The Albazerolg Lord Diplock observed that negligence liability does 
not provide a complete substituted remedy for some types of loss caused 
by breach of a contract of carriage, giving late delivery as the most obvious 
example. His Lordship also noted that the Bills of Lading Act and the 
development of the doctrine in Brandt v Liverpool, Brazil and River Plate 
Steam Navigation Co. LtdZO had reduced the scope and utility of the rule 
in Dunlop where goods were carried under a bill of lading.21 However, 
the rule extended to all forms of carriage including carriage by sea where 
no bill of lading had been issued, and there might still be occasional cases 
in which the rule would provide a remedy where no other would be available 
to a person sustaining ioss which under a rational legal system ought to 
be compensated by the person who caused it. Lord Diplock thus thought 
that the rule should not simply be jettisoned. 
While the seller may then, exceptionally, maintain an action, probably 
he cannot be compelled by the buyer to  do so. Certainly in The AlbazerozZ 
this was Lord Diplock's understanding of the limits to the Dunlop rule. 
Turning to the statutory reform in this field, by section 13 of the Mercantile 
Law Act 1908 the holder of a bill of lading issued in respect of goods 
acquires a cause of action in contract against the carrier. Section 13 is 
the New Zealand equivalent of section 1 of the United Kingdom Bills of 
Lading Act 1855, providing that every consignee of goods named in a bill 
of lading, and every endorsee of a bill of lading, to whom the property 
in the goods passes on or by reason of such consignment or endorsement, 
shall have transferred to and vested in him all rights of action, and be 
subject to the same liabilities, in respect of such goods as if the contract 
contained in the bill of lading had been made with himself. 
- 
A buyer cannot take the benefit of section 13 if he does not acquire 
property in the goods under a bill of lading. An important example of 
such a case can be where bulk cargo is shipped and the buyer buys part 
of the bulk. A buyer who takes under a ship's delivery order may thereby 
enter into a contract with the carrier, certainly if he pays the freight and 
thus provides consideration23, but if he becomes the holder of a seller's 
16 See below p.89 
17 See below p.89 
I n  [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 679. 
'9 [I9771 A.C. 774 at 846-847. 
20 [I9241 1 K.B. 575. 
2 '  See below p.89 
22 [I9771 A.C. 774 at 845. 
23 AS to which see below p.89 
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delivery order he will not acquire any contractual rights against the carrier 
without an attornment by the carrier. In this type of case property cannot 
pass until the goods become ascertained24 and this will be after the damage 
has occurred. Similarly a freight forwarder may consolidate consignments 
by different shippers and take the bill of lading in his own name. He may 
then split the consignment among his clients by procuring the issue of 
ship's delivery orders or by issuing his own "house" bill of lading (which 
is not technically a bill of lading at all because it is not issued by the 
carrier) or a forwarder's certificate of transport. Section 13 does not seem 
to apply here either. Again, where goods are shipped under an ocean waybill 
rather than a bill of lading, section 13 does not apply as waybills are not 
documents of title. 
An alternative means by which the buyer may be able to sue on the 
contract of carriage is under the general provisions of the Contracts (Privity) 
Act 1982. Whether he can do so turns on whether the terms of section 
4 are met. The buyer must be a third party beneficiary who is sufficiently 
designated "by name, description, or reference to a class" and who is intended 
to take the benefit of the contract between the consignor and the carrier. 
Depending on the particular facts these conditions might sometimes be 
satisfied. It seems likely that they would be in the case, for example, of 
goods shipped to a named consignee under a non-transferable ocean waybill. 
But take the situation where goods are shipped under a bill of lading which 
does not name the consignee. Could the consignee still be regarded as 
sufficiently identified by desctiption? And could the requisite intention be 
established? The answer to questions such as these cannot be regarded 
as certain.25 Clearly, however, the 1982 Act has the potential to provide 
a remedy in circumstances not covered by section 13. 
Lastly, the buyer may in any event be able to sue on the basis of an 
implied contract with the carrier, in accordance with the decision of the 
United Kingdom Court of Appeal in Brandt v Liverpool, Brazil and River 
Plate Steam Navigation Co. Ltd26. Here the plaintiffs were bankers to whom 
a bill of lading had been endorsed and delivered by way of pledge. They 
were not at any time owners of the goods in question and were unable 
to rely on the 1855 Act. It was held that a contract incorporating the terms 
of the bill of lading was to be implied between the plaintiffs and defendants 
because the plaintiffs had paid the freight due on the cargo and the defendants 
had delivered the goods to them against surrender of the bill. The principle 
in Brandt's case was applied in the case of a purchaser of goods in Cremer 
v General Carriers S.A.27 where part of a bulk cargo of tapioca was delivered 
to the purchaser in exchange for a ship's delivery order and payment by 
the purchaser of the freight. 
24 Sale of Goods Act 1908, s. 18. 
l5 S. 4 was considered by the Court of Appeal in Gartside v Sheffield, Young & Ellis [I9831 
N.Z.L.R. 37, where it was held (at 41-42, 49, 54) that the beneficiary under a will benefited 
only incidentally from the performance of the contract of retainer between testatrix and 
solicitor and thus could not have taken advantage of s. 4 even had it been in force at 
the relevant time. The solicitor nonetheless owed a negligence duty to the beneficiary to 
take care to present the will for execution by the testatrix within a reasonable time. 
26 [I9241 1 K.B. 474. 
2' [I9741 1 W.L.R. 341. 
Canterbury Law Review [Vol. 3,  19861 
A buyer who is in a position to  sue in contract might prefer to make 
a claim in negligence, for reasons to be considered later. A buyer who 
is not in that position has a more pressing need to do so. In the United 
Kingdom there were until recently conflicting first instance decisions on 
whether the carrier owed a duty of care to the buyer without property 
at the time of the damage. As will be seen, the House of Lords has now 
resolved the conflict in favour of the carrier and against the buyer. In 
New Zealand there are many arguably analogous cases but none on the 
particular matter in issue. 
(1) The Wear Breeze 
In Margarine Union G.m.b.H.v Cambay Prince Steamship Co. Ltd 
(The Wear Breeze)28 the plaintiffs'purchased part of a bulk shipment of 
copra being shipped by the defendant shipowners from the Far East to 
Hamburg. When the copra was unloaded it was discovered that it had 
been seriously damaged by giant American cockroaches. The damage 
occurred because the defendants had failed adequately to fumigate the vessel 
prior to  loading its cargo. The plaintiffs accepted the goods under sellers' 
delivery orders and had no action under the 1855 Act. The plaintiffs 
thereupon sued the shipowners in negligence. Roskill J. held that the action 
failed because the shipowners owed no duty of care to anyone who was 
not the owner of the goods at the time when the tort of negligence was 
committed and that the plaintiffs only acquired title to the copra at the 
time of discharge, when it was separated from the bulk. 
Counsel for the plaintiffs argued that since Donoghue v S t e v e n ~ o n ~ ~  and, 
more particularly, Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd30 it 
was sufficient that loss to the plaintiff was foreseeable, at least so long 
as there was physical damage to goods which ultimately became the property 
of the plaintiffs and so long as the relationship between the parties was 
sufficiently proximate. On the latter point counsel stressed that the range 
of foreseeability was limited to the last c.i.f. buyer who might buy the 
goods while still afloat and that it did not extend to a buyer ex-ship or 
beyond. Alternatively he submitted that the plaintiffs had a cause of action 
in negligence because the goods were at their risk as from the moment 
of shipment and for this reason came within the range of those to whom 
the defendants must be taken to owe a duty of care. 
Counsel for the defendants argued on the contrary that in truth the 
plaintiffs were seeking to recover damages because their purchase had turned 
out to be less advantageous to them than they had anticipated: instead 
of getting the goods in sound contractual condition they got them badly 
damaged by cockroaches. This kind of loss was, he submitted, not 
recoverable in tort. Furthermore, the doctrine of risk was a concept of 
the law of sale of goods and was of no relevance in determining how far 
the duty of a tortfeasor extended. 
Roskill J. did not comment expressly on the desirability of recognising 
a duty of care owed by the carrier to the buyer. He was, however, satisfied 
that there was a long established line of authority which precluded the 
28 [I9691 1 Q.B. 219. 
29 [I9321 A.C. 562. 
30 [I9641 A.C. 465. 
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buyer's claim and which was unaffected by Hedley Byrne. This line of 
authority included the following cases: Cattle v Stockton Waterworks Co.3' 
(contractor building a tunnel on another's land not entitled to recover from 
waterworks company which caused damage to the land, rendering the 
building contract less profitable); Simpson v Th0mpson3~ (insurance 
underwriter had no direct right against a tortfeasor who damaged the 
underwriter's assured's property); Socikte Anonyme de Remorquage a Helice 
v Bennett+ (plaintiff tug owners could not sue wrongdoer who had sunk 
the plaintiff's tow for loss of the benefit of the contract of towage); Chargeurs 
Rkunis Compagnie Franpise de Navigation a Vapeur v English and 
American Shipping C O ~ ~  (time charterers of ship unable to recover for 
economic loss because of damage done by a third party to the chartered 
vessel); Weller v Foot and Mouth Disease Research I n ~ t i t u t e ~ ~  (cattle 
auctioneers could not recover for business loss when foot and mouth disease 
virus escaped from the defendants' premises, leading to the slaughter of 
or restrictions on movement of cattle in the area). Roskill J. found further 
support for his decision by reference to Brandt's case, asking himself the 
rhetorical question why, if the plaintiffs had a right to sue the defendants 
in tort for negligence, should there have been any need for implying a 
contract between them. 
(2) The Irene's Success : The Nea Tyhi 
The decision in The Wear Breeze stood unchallenged until 1982. Then 
in Schiffahrt and Kohlen G.m.b.H.v Chelsea Maritime Ltd: The Irene's 
Success36 Lloyd J .  (formerly counsel for the unsuccessful plaintiffs in The 
Wear Breeze) was persuaded that developments in negligence liability during 
the intervening period required that the no liability rule should be 
reconsidered. The plaintiffs were c.i.f. buyers of a complete cargo of coking 
coal being shipped on the defendants' ship. The cargo was damaged by 
sea water during the course of the voyage. The plaintiffs had no action 
in contract as they never became holders of the bill of lading and so brought 
an action in negligence. Lloyd J. held, adopting the two-stage test of duty 
laid down by Lord Wilberforce in Anns' case,37 (i) that there was a sufficient 
relationship of proximity between the plaintiffs as c.i.f. buyers and the 
defendants as sea carriers to give rise to a prima facie duty of care on 
the part of the defendants, because under a normal c.i.f. contract the risk 
passed from the sellers to the buyers on shipment and so the sellers should 
reasonably have contemplated that carelessness by them in carrying the 
goods would be likely to damage the buyers at whose risk the goods were 
held: and (ii) that there were no considerations which negatived, reduced 
or limited the prima facie duty of care thus arising since the defendants 
would not be exposed to unlimited liability and the plaintiffs' loss was 
a direct reflection of the physical damage caused to the cargo. 
The recent cases relied upon by Lloyd J. in reaching this conclusion, 
1875) L.R. 10 Q.B. 453. 
1877) 3 App. Cas. 279. 
191 11 1 K.B. 243. 
1921) 9 Lloyd's Rep. 464. 
19661 1 Q.B. 569. 
19821 Q.B. 481. 
19781 A.C. 728 at 751-752. 
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and the principles they espouse, will be amplified shortly.38 
Similar views to those of Lloyd J. were expressed, obiter, by Sheen J. 
in The Nea Tyhi39. The claim here succeeded in contract in any event but 
the learned judge also said that he would if necessary have followed The 
Irene's Success rather than The Wear Breeze, for the reasons given by Lloyd 
J. in the former case. 
(3) The Aliakmon 
The conflict between The Wear Breeze and The Irene's Success was 
subsequently resolved by the U.K. Court of Appeal and thereafter by the 
House of Lords in Leigh & Sillavan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd: 
The Aliakmon40. The plaintiffs made a c. and f, contract to buy from the 
sellers steel coils to be shipped from Korea to Immingham, England. The 
price was to be paid by a 180 day bill of exchange to be endorsed by 
the buyer's bank in return for a bill of lading relating to the goods. The 
buyers intended to finance the transaction by reselling the goods to sub- 
buyers before the bill of lading was tendered by the sellers. They were, 
however, unable to find the hoped-for purchasers and in these circumstances 
their bank declined to back the bill of exchange. Representatives of the 
buyers and sellers discussed the matter and it was agreed to vary the original 
contract of sale so that (i) the sellers, despite delivery of the bill of lading, 
should have the right of disposal of the goods, (ii) the buyers should take 
delivery of the goods on presentation of the bill of lading but solely as 
agents for the sellers and (iii) the goods should be stored in a covered 
warehouse to the sole order of the sellers. The terms of the varied contract 
were duly carried out but after discharge the goods were found to have 
been damaged by improper stowage. The buyers subsequently paid the 
sellers and then brought an action against the carriers claiming damages 
for breach of contract and/ or negligence. 
It was held by Staughton J. at first instance41 that the claim in contract 
succeeded and that there was, therefore, no need to consider the merits 
of the claim in tort. On appeal to the Court of Appeal42, however, it was 
held that both claims should fail. The buyers further appealed to the House 
of Lords but only as regards the negligence action. The Lords affirmed 
the decision of the Court of Appeal and refused to recognise any duty 
of care as being owed to the buyers. 
As regards the buyer's contractual cause of action the Court of Appeal 
held that Brandt's case should be distinguished and that there was no implied 
contract between the buyers and the carriers, because the buyers acted 
as agents for the sellers in presenting the bill of lading and taking delivery 
of the goods. The buyers did not, it was held, acquire any rights under 
the Bills of Lading Act either. The sellers having reserved the right of 
disposal of the goods, the property in them did not pass to the buyers 
upon or by reason of the endorsement of the bill of lading, as required 
by the Act, but only upon payment of the purchase price by the buyers 
to the sellers, after the goods had been discharged and stored. The Act 
These cases included Caltex Oil (Australia) Pry Ltd v The Dredge "Willemstad" (1976) 
136 C.L.R.  529 and Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co. Ltd [I9831 1 A.C. 520. 
39 [I9821 1 Lloyd's Rep. 606. 
40 [I9861 A.C. 785 
4 '  [I9831 1 Lloyd's Rep. 203. 
42 [I9851 Q.B. 350. 
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could not, therefore, apply to the varied contract. Ordinarily in the case 
of a contract ex-warehouse the risk would pass at the same time as the 
property but here it had already passed to the buyers on shipment because 
of the original c. and f. terms, and there was nothing in the new terms 
which caused it to revert to the sellers. 
As for the claim in negligence, neither the Court of Appeal nor the House 
of Lords saw the developments in negligence liability since 1969, and in 
particular the increasing readiness of some courts to allow recovery for 
pure economic loss, as any reason for departing from the decision of Roskill 
J. in The Wear Breeze or from the older authorities relied upon in that 
case. Counsel for the buyers had urged upon the House a number of grounds 
for contending that The Wear Breeze was wrongly decided at the time 
or at any rate should be regarded as wrongly decided today. These 
contentions, and the reasons given for their rejection, will be examined 
in turn. 
It was argued first of all that in the other non-recovery cases the plaintiffs 
were persons whose contractual rights entitled them to have either the use 
or services of the property concerned and thereby make profits or to render 
services to the property concerned and thereby to earn remuneration. By 
contrast buyers under c.i.f. or c. and f. contracts of sale were persons to 
whom it was intended that the legal ownership of the goods should later 
pass and who were, therefore, prospectively the legal owners. Lord Brandon, 
with whose judgment Lords Keith, Brightman, Griffiths and Ackner 
concurred, recognised that the difference existed, but thought it made no 
difference to the principle of law to be applied. In all cases the plaintiffs 
were complaining that by reason of their contracts with others they had 
suffered loss caused by damage to the others' p r ~ p e r t y . ~ '  
Secondly, counsel argued that the buyers, by agreeing to buy ascertained 
goods, had thereby acquired equitable ownership of the goods and thus 
were entitled to sue in tort for damage to the goods without joining the 
legal owner. Lord Brandon rejected the argument, noting that in the field 
of equitable ownership of land the equitable owner must join the legal 
owner as a party, whether as co-plaintiff or co-defendant, and there was 
no reason why this should not also be so in the field of equitable ownership 
of goods. His Lordship also expressed the view that while it was possible 
for equitable interests in goods to be created and to exist, it was extremely 
doubtful whether this could happen within the confines of an ordinary 
contract of sale. He said that the Sale of Goods Act is a complete code 
in respect of contracts for the sale of goods and the sections of the Act 
dealing with the passing of property draw no distinction between the legal 
and the equitable property. He thought there was much force in the 
observations of Atkin L.J. in In re Wait44 to the following effect: 
"It would have been futile in a code intended for commercial men to have created an elaborate 
structure of rules dealing with rights at law, if at the same time it was intended to leave, 
subsisting with the legal rights, equitable rights inconsistent with, more extensive, and coming 
into existence earlier than, the rights so carefully set out in the various sections of the code." 
Lord Brandon did not finally determine the point but his provisional 
41 [I9861 A.C. 785 at 81 I. 
44 [I9271 1 Ch. 606 at 635-636. 
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view was in accordance with that of Atkin L.J.45 
The heart of the case which was made for the buyers lay in counsel's 
third submission, concerning developments in the law of negligence since 
1969. The proper way to approach the present case was, he said, to apply 
Lord Wilberforce's two-stage test of duty in Anns' case (as Lloyd J .  had 
done in The Irene's Success). The answer to the first question had to be 
that there was here a sufficient relationship of proximity between the carriers 
and the buyers as to give rise to a prima facie duty. With regard to the 
second question, counsel conceded that it would be unjust if the terms 
of the bill of lading under which the shipowner agreed to carry the goods 
were to be disregarded. He thus argued that the shipowners' duty was 
qualified by those terms: the buyers had, by entering into a c. and f. contract 
with the sellers, impliedly consented to the terms of the bailment of the 
goods by the sellers to the shipowners. 
As a preliminary matter, Lord Brandon made it clear that he did not 
think the Anns test was appropriate in the instant  circumstance^.^^ It did 
not provide, and could not have been intended by Lord Wilberforce to 
provide, a universally applicable test of the existence and scope of a duty 
of care in negligence. Lord Wilberforce was, moreover, dealing with the 
approach to be adopted in a novel type of factual situation which was 
not analogous to any factual situation in which the existence of a duty 
had already been held to exist. He was not suggesting that the same approach 
should be adopted in a factual situation in which the existence of a duty 
had been repeatedly denied.47 
Lord Brandon had no doubt that the present case fell into the latter 
category. He had earlier referred to the authorities relied upon by Roskill 
J. in The Wear Breeze and he added to this list the recent decision of 
the Privy Council in Candlewood Navigation Corp. Ltd v Mitsui O.S.K. 
Lines Ltd: The Mineral Transporter48. In this case the plaintiffs were time 
charterers of a ship which was involved in a collision with the defendants' 
ship, the collision being caused by the negligence of the defendants. The 
plaintiffs suffered loss in the form of wasted payments of hire and loss 
of profits. It was held that the rule against recovery for non-owners should 
be upheld. Lord Fraser, delivering the judgment of the Board, thought 
that this common law limitation provided an acceptable control mechanism 
upon the liability of a wrongdoer toward those who suffered economic 
damage in consequence of his negligence. The rule was generally accepted 
45 [I9861 A.C. 785 at 813. 
46  Ibid., at 815. 
47 Any useful continuing role for Lord Wilberforce's two-stage test was also downplayed 
by Lord Keith in Governors of the Peabody Donation Fund v Sir Lindsay Parkinson 
& Co. Ltd [I9851 A.C. 210 at 240. Differing views about the test have been expressed 
in the High Court of Australia in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 59 A.L.J.R. 
564, Brennan and Deane J.J. rejecting it (at 586, 588 and 593-595, 598-600) and Gibbs 
C.J. supporting it (at 570). The two-stage approach has recently been affirmed as part 
of New Zealand law by Woodhouse P, in Takaro Properties Ltdv  Rowling[1986] 1 N.Z.L.R. 
22, in a broad way by Cooke J.  in Brown v Heathcote [1986] 1 N.Z.L.R. 76 and by 
Tompkins J .  in Craig v East Coast Bays County Council [I9861 1 N.Z.L.R. 99. It has 
also been accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada in City of Kamloops v Nielsen (1984) 
10 D.L.R (4d) 641. For discussion of the uncertainties and difficulties involved in the 
Anns approach, see Smillie "Principle, Policy and Negligence" (1984) 11 N.Z.U.L.R. 11 1. 
[I9861 A.C. 1. 
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in many countries and had the merit of drawing a definite and readily 
ascertainable line. It enabled legal practitioners to advise their clients with 
reasonable certainty and their Lordships were not aware of any widespread 
dissatisfaction with the rule. 
Counsel in The Aliakmon contended that the policy reason behind the 
exclusion of the duty in The Mineral Transporter and earlier cases was 
to avoid the opening of the floodgates so as to expose a negligent defendant 
to unlimited liability to an indefinite number of other persons whose 
contractual rights had been adversely affected by the negligence. He argued 
that recognition of a duty owed to a c.i.f. or c. and f, buyer would not 
open any floodgates and would create only a strictly limited exception 
to the general rule. Lord Brandon thought, however, that the law should 
not allow special pleading in a particular case to detract from a long 
established rule which was simple to understand and easy to apply. Further 
detractions would, moreover, inevitably be attempted. This would 
undermine the certainty of the rule, a factor of the utmost importance 
in commercial cases. 
Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co. Ltd49 was also cited in support of the 
buyers' argument. In this case, of course, the owner of a factory was held 
to have a direct action in tort against a sub-contractor installing a new 
floor in his factory, as regards defects in the method of construction of 
the floor. The decision was said to be of no direct help to the buyers 
in the present case because the plaintiffs held to have a good cause of 
action were the legal owners of the floor. Lord Roskill's judgment was, 
however, also put forward in support of the contention that any duty owed 
to the c.i.f. buyer would be subject to the terms of the bill of lading pursuant 
to which the goods were shipped. Lord Roskill had suggested50 that the 
existence of an exclusion clause in the main contract 5 1  might limit the 
duty of care owed by the sub-contractor. Lord Brandon opined that on 
the contrary there was no convincing legal basis for qualifying a duty of 
care owed by A to B by reference to a contract to which A was, but B 
was not, a party.52 In the Court of Appeal Sir John Donaldson M.R. 
had observed that the commonest form of contract of carriage by sea is 
one on the terms of the Hague Rules and had found himself unable to 
see how the responsibilities and liabilities laid down in those Rules could 
be synthesised into a standard of care.53 Lord Brandon similarly was unable 
to understand how the necessary synthesis could be made.54 
The majority in the Court of Appeal55 concluded that a good policy 
reason against recovery was the fact that recognition of a duty of care 
owed to non-owners would impose on the shipowner most of the liabilities 
which he would generally assume by contract by virtue of the Hague Rules 
but without the protection of those Rules. Seemingly, then, Lord Brandon 
was of a similar view. 
Lord Brandon turned finally to consider the principle of "transferred 
49 [I9831 1 A.C. 520. 
50 Ibid., at 546. 
51  Does this refer to the contract between the owner and the main contractor or between 
the sub-contractor and the main contractor? In context it is presumably the latter. 
52 Lord Brandon thus read Lord Roskill's judgment in the way suggested above, fn. 51. 
53 [I9851 Q.B. 350 at 368. 
54 [I9861 A.C. 785 at 818. 
55 Sir John Donaldson M.R. and Oliver L.J. 
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1oss"put forward by Robert Goff L.J. in the Court of Appeal.56 The principle 
was formulated in this way. Where A owes a duty of care in tort not 
to cause physical damage to B's property, and commits a breach of that 
duty in circumstances in which the loss of or physical damage to the property 
will ordinarily fall on B but (as is reasonably foreseeable by A) such loss 
or damage, by reason of a contractual relationship between B and C, falls 
upon C, then C will be entitled, subject to the terms of any contract restricting 
A's liability to B, to bring an action in tort against A in respect of such 
loss or damage to the extent that it falls on him, C .  Robert Goff L.J. 
recognised that there would have to be exceptions to the principle, in 
particular in the case of contracts of insurance. However the principle was, 
he thought, desirable in point of policy. There was no question of any 
wide or indeterminate liability being imposed on wrongdoers: the shipowner 
was simply held liable to the buyer in damages for loss for which he would 
ordinarily be liable to the goods owner. 
Lord Brandon thought that this principle was not only not supported 
by authority but on the contrary was inconsistent with it. Even if there 
was a genuine lacuna in the law he would be reluctant to fill it in this 
way. In any event there was in fact no such lacuna. Section 1 of the Bills 
of Lading Act provided an adequate and fair remedy to the buyer and 
there was no need for any alternative remedy in tort for negligence. In 
the present case the buyers should have made it a term of the variation 
of the contract that the sellers should exercise their right to sue for damage 
to the goods for the benefit of the buyers or should assign such right to 
them. As matters stood, the buyers had deprived themselves of their rights 
under the Act and had not stipulated for any independent right.5' 
In the result Lord Brandon affirmed The Wear Breeze as good law at 
the time it was decided and good law today. The Irene's Success was overruled 
and the dicta of Sheen J. in The Nea Tyhi disapproved. 
IV. EVALUATION OF THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION 
The objections to giving a tort remedy to the buyer which were influential 
in The Aliakmon may be summarised as (i) the risk of opening the floodgates, 
(ii) the uncertainties inherent in the notion of proximity, and (iii) the by- 
passing of the carrier's contractual rights. The first of these is, perhaps, 
the least troublesome. It  would, indeed, have been met if the Lords had 
simply accepted that a person who agreed to buy goods acquired an equitable 
property in the goods and with it an independent right to sue for loss 
of or damage to the goods. It is of interest to note that the decision in 
re Wait, rejecting equitable interests in parts of bulk consignments of goods, 
which met with Lord Brandon's provisional approval, was described at 
the time by Sir Frederick Pollock as being "as inconvenient to many 
merchants as it is surprising to the Equity Bar-58. No doubt with the passage 
of time any possibility of recognising equitable interests under contracts 
for the sale of goods has receded further, this being reflected in Lord 
Brandon's judgment. There is nonetheless a clear affinity between this 
56 [I9851 Q.B. 350 at 399. 
57 [I9861 A.C. 785 at 819. 
58 (1927) 43 L.Q.R. 293. 
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contention and the principle of transferred loss propounded by Robert 
Goff L.J. This principle similarly meets the "indeterminacy" factor and 
in addition resolves the objection that from the point of view of the carrier, 
the no liability rule can operate in a quite fortuitous manner. As Sheen 
J. observed in The Nea Tyhi, the advantage of the decision of Lloyd J. 
in The Irene's success, in a case where legal ownership of the goods passed 
while they were still afloat and damage to them was done progressively 
during the voyage, was that it obviated the need for a difficult enquiry 
into how much of the damage occurred before, and how much after, the 
time when the ownership passed. Of course, the carrier would be liable 
to the buyer for the whole loss if the damage happened to occur after 
the passing of property or if, as he normally would, the buyer acquired 
a cause of action in contract. In a comment on The Mineral Transporter59 
it has similarly been observed that where a ship is subject to a time charter 
the loss of profits is divided between the owner and the time charterer 
but the loss is the same and should be recoverable by the party on whom 
it happened to fall. Why should the tortfeasor's liability be reduced because 
(quite fortuitously from his point of view) the chattel happened to be the 
subiect of a contract of hire? 
It is apparent that the Lords saw certainty in the law as all important 
and were not prepared to make exceptions for "special" cases. The difficulty 
in drawing distinctions between persons who in some way suffered financial 
loss as a consequence of physical damage being inflicted on another's 
property was such that the exercise should not be attempted. In other fields, 
however, not concerning contracts with long-established commercial practice 
as background, some courts have been prepared to allow recovery for pure 
financial loss if the relationship between the parties is a particularly close 
and proximate one. For example in Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The 
Dredge " Willemstad'go the defendant dredge negligently damaged a third 
party's oil pipeline running directly to the plaintiffs7 oil terminal and was 
held liable for the expense incurred by the plaintiffs in arranging alternative 
means of transporting the oil to their terminal. This case was accorded 
close attention by the Privy Council in The Mineral Transporter, but their 
Lordships found themselves unable to extract from the five judgments in 
the High Court any single ratio decidendi. Again in Gartside v Sheffild, 
Young and Ellis61 a testatrix's solicitors were held to owe to a named 
beneficiary under the testatrix's proposed will a duty to  take care to present 
the will for execution with all due diligence. 
Perhaps cases such as these may be regarded as too far removed from 
any claim by a buyer of damaged goods. Arguably more in point, however, 
are the defective building cases. Of these, only Junior Books attracted any 
comment. In The Mineral Transporter the Privy Council recognised that 
Junior Books might be re'garded as having extended the scope of duty 
somewhat, but any extension was not in the direction of recognising a 
title to sue in a party who suffered economic loss because his contract 
with the victim of the wrong was rendered less profitable or ~nprofitable.6~ 
59 Jones (1986) 102 L.Q.R. 13 at 16-17. 
(1976) 136C.L.R.  529(H.C.A.). 
" [I9831 N.Z.L.R. 37. See also Allied Finance and Investments Ltd v Haddow & Co. [1983] 
N.Z.L.R. 22; Meates v Attorney-General [1983] N.Z.L.R. 308; Takaro Properties Ltd v 
R o w l i n ~  [I9861 I N.Z.L.R. 22. 
OL LlY86J A.C. I at 24-25. 
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In The Aliakmon the decision in Junior Books was rationalised, as we 
have seen, as being of no direct help because the plaintiffs were the legal 
owners of the fl00r.63 Neither of these arguments looks convincing. As 
regards the former, it could be said that the "victim" of the sub-contractor's 
breach of contract was the main contractor and this rendered the plaintiff's 
contract with the victim less profitable. Once the plaintiff's right of action 
is recognised he becomes, ipso facto, a victim of the wrong and the argument 
is thus circular, assuming what it seeks to prove64. As regards the latter, 
while it is true that Junior Books were always the owners, there are many 
other similar cases where the plaintiffs were subsequent purchasers. In the 
United Kingdom Anns is, no doubt, the leading case. In New Zealand 
a similar principle has frequently been applied by the Court of Appeal, 
initially in Bowen v Paramount Builders (Hamilton) Ltd65 and Mount Albert 
B.C. v Johnson66 and most recently in Stieller v Porirua C.C6', Brown 
v Heathcote C.C.68 and Craig v East Coast Bays C.C.69. Bowen, Johnson 
and Stieller all concerned persons who bought houses with existing defects 
in them. 
In Brown's case Cooke J .  commented that there appeared to be nothing 
in any New Zealand decision contrary to the decisions of the Privy Council 
and the House of Lords in The Mineral Transporter and The Aliakmon. 
However, is there any real distinction in principle to be drawn between 
a subsequent owner of goods suing the carrier for damage inflicted on 
the goods before he became owner and the subsequent purchaser of a house 
suing the builder (and/or local authority) for defects in the house created 
in the course of construction? Both are suing for financial loss caused by 
having acquired damaged or defective property. If the aim solely is to achieve 
consistency then it is submitted that the buyer also should have his action. 
There remains for consideration, however, the further problem in giving 
a tort remedy to the buyer, the nature of which also is inherent in the 
defective building and some other financial loss cases, concerning the 
capacity of the tort action to deprive the carrier of his contractual defences 
in the Hague Rules. He might wish, for example, to rely on Article IV 
rule 2(a) (carrier not responsible for neglect or default of master or crew 
as regards the navigation or management of the ship70), Article IV rule 
5 (carrier not liable for loss or damage to goods exceeding $200 per package 
or unit unless nature and value inserted in the bill of lading7'), or Article 
I1 rule 5 (suit to be brought within one year of delivery of the goods72). 
The shipper himself cannot evade these contractual stipulations by suing 
in tort. By Article I1 of the Hague Rules, under every contract of carriage 
of goods by sea the carrier, in relation to the loading, handling, stowage, 
carriage, custody, care and discharge of such goods is subject to the 
responsibilities and liabilities and entitled to the rights and immunities 
63 319861 A.C. 785 at 817. 
64  ones-(1986) 102 L.Q.R. 13 at 16. 
65 [I9771 1 N.Z.L.R. 394. 
66 [1979j 2 N.Z.L.R. 234. 
67 [I9861 1 N.Z.L.R. 84. 
68 [I9861 1 N.Z.L.R. 76. 
" [I9861 1 N.Z.L.R. 99. 
See Letley, Marine Cargo Claims (2nd ed.), ch. 14; Goode, op.cit. at 612-613. 
7 '  Goode, op.cit., at 614-616. 
72 Tetley, op.cit., ch. 30; Goode, op.cit. at 617-618. 
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contained in the Rules. Fairly clearly, then, any contract of carriage subject 
to the Hague Rules excludes any possible wider tort l iabili t~.~3 A claim 
by a non-contracting buyer under section 13 of the 1908 Act or under the 
Privity Act is similarly barred. This is because under section 13 the consignee 
or endorsee has transferred to  him all rights of action in respect of the 
goods "as if the contract contained in the bill of lading had been made 
with himself", and under section 9(2) of the Privity Act the promisor has 
available to him by way of defence, counterclaim, set-off or otherwise any 
matter which would have been available to him (a) if the beneficiary had 
been a party to the deed or contract in which the promise is contained 
or (b) if the beneficiary were the promisee, the promise had been made 
for the benefit of the promisee and the proceedings had been brought by 
the promisee. In these postulated events the carrier would be able to rely 
on the terms of his contract containing the Hague Rules and may thus 
do likewise in any action brought by the consignee as such or as third 
party beneficiary. 
Where the buyer does not sue in contract, one would think Lord Brandon 
clearly was right in concluding that the carrier cannot raise contractual 
defences against a non-party and that contractual obligations under a bill 
of lading incorporating the Hague Rules cannot be synthesised into a 
standard of care. A similar point was made in Bowen where Richmond 
P. held74 that a builder cannot say that the nature of his contractual duties 
to the original owner of land sets a limit to any duty of care he owes 
to a subsequent purchaser. Thus a buyer who for some reason cannot take 
advantage of section 13 or the 1982 Act is not burdened by contractual 
stipulations between others. Equally this is the case, it seems, if a buyer 
has available to him a statutory right of action as consignee or third party 
beneficiary but chooses not to assert it. In New Zealand it would appear 
that a tort action is in fact far more likely to be employed as a means 
of avoiding contractual limitations rather than as providing a remedy where 
none otherwise exists. 
In Bowen a duty was recognised irrespective of the builder's contractual 
position whereas in The Aliakmon the majority in the Court of Appeal 
and by implication Lord Brandon in the House of Lords denied any duty 
precisely because the carrier had only agreed to carry the goods in terms 
of the Hague Rules. The Aliakmon reasoning on this point does seem 
compelling. Apart from any question of injustice to the carrier, to  give 
an unfettered tort action to the buyer would seem clearly to circumvent 
the policy of the Privity Act, if not section 13 of the Mercantile Law Act. 
Furthermore it would perhaps run counter to the international obligations 
of New Zealand in ratifying the Brussels convention and passing legislation 
incorporating the Hague Rules into domestic law. As the Rules are intended 
to provide an agreed code regulating the responsibilities of the sea carrier, 
domestic law should not, therefore, also provide an alternative and possibly 
wider remedy. 
73 Even in the absence of specific provision, tort liability would seem to be excluded by 
the rule against co-extensive liability in contract and tort laid down in McLaren Maycroft 
& Co. v Fletcher Development Co. Ltd [I9731 2 N.Z.L.R. 100. The rule has recently 
been affirmed by the Privy Council in the context of a banker-client relationship: see 
Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [I9861 A.C. 80 at 107. 
74 119771 N.Z.L.R. 394 at 407. see also Woodhouse J. at 419. 
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In New Zealand, at least, to deny a remedy in negligence to the buyer 
will create no serious injustice in the light of the statutory causes of action 
available to him. However, as it cannot always be regarded as certain that 
the Privity Act will fill the gaps left by section 13 of the Mercantile Law 
Act, some reform in the areas of doubt identified earlier would be desirable. 
The problem of purchasers of part of bulk cargoes could be addressed 
by allowing property to pass in an unascertained part of the bulk. This 
was the position in the United States under section 17 of the Uniform 
Sales Act. The same policy has been adopted in section 2-105(4) of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (in force in all States except Louisiana), which 
also specifically provides in section 1-201 (15) that documents of title 
(including bills of lading) may relate to portions of an unidentified mass75. 
Further, section 13 of the Mercantile Law Act could be amended to cover 
the consignee who acquires title other than through becoming the holder 
of a bill of lading76. 
There remains the wider question whether a similar attitude ought to 
be taken towards other kinds of third party claims for financial loss arising 
out of non-performance or mis-performance of contractual obligations. The 
kinds of difficulties identified above can equally arise in cases concerning 
the negligence liability to third parties of, for example, solicitors, 
accountants, engineers, builders and architects. Possibly the sea carrier's 
immunity from tort ought to be regarded as exceptional in the light of 
the international commercial context to the buyer's claim. Yet it can well 
be argued that the third party's remedy in all these cases should be found, 
if at all, within the terms of the Contracts (Privity) Act77. 
One final point will be noted. While The Aliakmon denies any claim 
in tort by the buyer without property when the damage occurs, it does 
not suggest that the buyer with property cannot sue. It was noted earlier 
that he can maintain an action on ordinary principles, being the owner 
of goods physically damaged by the negligent carrier. The ElaJi78 is a recent 
example. In this kind of case the carrier still cannot rely on the Hague 
Rules. The problem would be resolved if New Zealand (and the U.K.) 
were to ratify and enact into domestic law the United Nations Convention 
on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, adopted in Hamburg in 1978. The Hamburg 
Rules are intended to replace the Hague-Visby Rules, from which they 
differ in a number of respects. In particular, it is provided in Article 7 
rule 1 that the defences and limits of liability provided for in the Convention 
apply in any action against the carrier in respect of loss or damage to 
the goods covered by the contract of carriage by sea as well as of delay 
in delivery, whether the action is founded in contract, in tort or otherwise. 
75 Nichol "The Passing of Property in Part of a Bulk" (1979) 42 M.L.R. 129 at 142. 
76 P. N. Todd "Bulk Buyers and Economic Loss" [I9831 J.B.L. 42 at 54. 
7' See Reyno1ds"Tort Acts in Contractual Situations" (1985) 11 N.Z.U.L.R. 215. 
78 [I9811 2 Lloyd's Rep. 679. 
